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Static and Dynamic Views of European Integration*
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University of Strathclyde, Glasgow
Abstract
There is a theoretical and empirical need to distinguish between static support for the EU as it now
is and dynamic support for further integration. Although most Europeans endorse the EU as a good
thing today, the European Election Study ﬁnds no popular majority for an ever closer union, the
commitment of EU institutions. Less than one-third endorses further integration and less than
one-third thinks integration has gone too far. The largest group favours keeping the EU as it is.
Their outlook reﬂects ambivalence; they see the EU as having both strengths and weaknesses. It
does not reﬂect lack of EU knowledge or of socio-economic resources, as is the case with ‘don’t
knows’. While eurozone institutions are committed to further integration, most EU citizens are
not. Likewise, there is no majority supporting eurosceptic demands for returning powers to na-
tional governments.
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Introduction
The concept of European integration is ambiguous: it has both static and dynamic mean-
ings. Studies of public opinion normally ask people to evaluate the European Union as it
is today (see Hobolt, 2012). This leaves open the opinions that respondents have about
change in any direction. A dynamic deﬁnition, stated explicitly in the Treaty of Rome,
is that European integration is a process of movement toward an ever closer Union. How-
ever, this is not the only form of change that is possible. Soft eurosceptics make the case
for less integration through the repatriation of EU powers to national governments and
hard eurosceptics argue for change in the form of their country exiting from the Union
(see Leconte, 2010). The dynamics of the eurozone are often conceptualized in terms of
a dichotomous choice between greater integration or the disintegration of the Eurozone,
or even the European Union (see e.g. Hodson, 2013).
Logically, current and dynamic views of Europeans can be combined in four different
ways. People who endorse the EU in its current form can also favour further measures of
integration; this is the position of the leaders of EU institutions. Alternatively, people who
dislike the current state of the EU can seek less integration, the stated position of the
British government under David Cameron and the German Alternative for Deutschland,
or they can want their country to withdraw from the EU, the stated position of the French
National Front (www.EU&I.eu). For people whose current and future preferences are in
harmony, the theoretical distinction between a time-speciﬁc and a dynamic view is of
no consequence: knowing a person’s current evaluation tells you their view of further
integration.
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People who positively evaluate the EU as it is today but do not endorse further integra-
tion combine contrasting views: they are conservative in the literal sense, preferring
stability to change. Herbert Simon’s (1978) theory of satisﬁcing justiﬁes describing this
group as satisﬁed with the status quo. The position may be justiﬁed by being positive
about existing institutions or sceptical about the putative beneﬁts of any change. A
preference for no change is consistent with Kahnemann and Tversky’s (1979) theory of
individuals being risk averse. Avoiding the risks of change is an argument often used
against Greek withdrawal from the eurozone and British exit from the EU. Dissatisfaction
with the EU as it is today and wanting more integration is the EU’s formal response to the
eurozone crisis (Tuori and Tuori, 2014). Democratic critics express their dissatisfaction
with the status quo by supporting the reform of EU institutions of representation in a
politically more integrated Europe (cf. Bellamy, 2012; Laffan, 2014).
Since the Treaty of Rome came into effect, institutional dynamics have promoted
further integration. Intergovernmental treaties conferring additional powers on European
institutions have been negotiated between national governments (Moravcsik, 1998;
Pollack, 2012), without what Haas (1968, p. 17) and Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig
(2009, p. 84) have described as ‘unnecessary’ public opinion surveys or public debates.
The cumulative effect of small-scale increases in powers without political negotiations
(Dehousse, 2011; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 2012) has been described as relying on
the public’s passive ‘permissive consensus’ to allow ‘integration by stealth’ (Haas,
1968, p. 17; Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970; Majone, 2005). However, the progressive
increase in the European Union’s visible inﬂuence on the lives of Europe’s citizens has
had its own spillover effect: ‘The times when elites could pursue European integration
with no regard to public opinion are long gone’ (Hobolt, 2012, p. 716).
This article is innovative in demonstrating both the theoretical and empirical importance
of taking into account Europeans who want to maintain the status quo when analysing
popular support for an ever closer Union. The next section shows that the median and
largest group favours keeping the EU as it is, rather than endorsing more integration,
endorsing less integration or having no opinion. Five hypotheses are offered to account
for these differences. Multivariate statistical tests ﬁnd that evaluations of government
performance are most important for discriminating between those wanting more or less
integration, while ambivalence about performance is most important for those in favour
of the status quo. Lack of resources best explains the ‘don’t knows’. The conclusion calls
attention to implications for the EU’s institutionalized commitment to increasing political
integration without the unqualiﬁed commitment of two-thirds of its citizens.
I. Attitudes Toward European Integration
A substantial body of research has conceptualized and measured popular evaluation of the
European Union in a wide variety of ways (Loveless and Rohrschneider, 2013). In a sub-
stantial review of the literature, Boomgaarden et al. (2012: 245ff) identiﬁed ﬁve different
sets of attitudes toward the EU. Statistical analysis of a multi-item Dutch survey identiﬁed
one of these as a dynamic factor labelled ‘strengthening’. The ﬁve items are conceptually
distinct, concerning everything from categoric approval of a United States of Europe to
enlargement of the EU; the notional integration factor is the statistically weakest of the
ﬁve (Boomgaarden et al., 2012 Table 1; cf. Anderson and Hecht, 2012: 17ff).
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The standard Eurobarometer measure of support for integration is static: Generally
speaking, do you think that your country’s membership of the European Union is a good
thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad? Although four alternatives are offered, a clear
majority usually evaluates the EU today as a good thing (Leconte, 2010, p. 164; Henjak
et al., 2012). Since this static question is regularly asked in the Eurobarometer, it has been
the object of dozens of political science analyses that dichotomize replies into those think-
ing the EU is a good thing and a composite category of those saying neither good nor bad,
bad, or don’t know (Hobolt, 2012, p. 517ff). After a sophisticated time-series econometric
analysis, Franklin and Wlezien (2013, p. 6) conclude that while the short-term shock of
events causes current evaluations to ﬂuctuate, there is a long-term stable equilibrium of
about 60 per cent thinking the EU is a good thing. Since EU integration has increased
every substantially over the decades spanned by the Eurobarometer (Dinan, 2010), a
steady level of support is often interpreted in Stimson’s (1991) terms as showing a ‘zone
of acquiescence’, an after-the-fact endorsement of steps that Europe’s policy-makers have
taken toward an ever closer Union.
Table 1: Attitudes Toward an Ever Closer Union by Country
Pro-integration Satisﬁed as is Anti-integration Don’t know
Romania 54 19 12 15
Spain 51 31 14 4
Poland 46 32 10 13
Slovenia 42 30 26 2
Greece 41 28 28 3
Italy 40 27 25 8
The Netherlands 39 40 19 1
Cyprus 36 28 30 7
Germany 36 36 27 1
Denmark 35 43 22 1
Lithuania 33 28 16 23
Sweden 33 43 23 2
Czech Republic 32 35 24 10
France 32 32 33 4
Luxembourg 32 35 30 2
Malta 32 24 15 30
Bulgaria 31 31 14 24
Ireland 31 48 20 2
Slovakia 31 35 15 18
Belgium 29 39 25 7
Hungary 29 31 27 13
Portugal 27 34 22 17
Austria 25 36 37 2
Estonia 25 32 32 11
Finland 19 48 32 1
United Kingdom 16 41 41 3
Latvia 15 27 44 14
Mean 33 34 25 9
Standard Deviation 9 7 9 8
Source: European Election Study 2009; Q80 recoded as follows: 0-3 anti-integration, 4-6 satisﬁed as is, 7-10 pro-integra-
tion; N=27,069.
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However, as the EU’s impact on national policies has increased since the Maastricht
Treaty, there has been a shift from passive acquiescence in further integration to a
‘constraining dissensus’ reﬂected by the rise of eurosceptic parties (Down and Wilson,
2008; Hooghe and Marks, 2009). The blanket term ‘eurosceptic’ lumps together parties
that differ in whether they are parties that are against further integration, parties that want
to reduce EU powers, and parties that favour withdrawing from the EU altogether
(Leconte, 2010, chapters 9–10; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2010). Some studies conclude
that the prime purpose of so-called eurosceptic parties is to protest against their national
governors rather than against what is done in Brussels (cf. Szczerbiak and Taggart,
2008; Mudde, 2013; Ford and Goodwin, 2014). Focus group discussions ﬁnd many
examples of individuals being ambivalent, associating the European Union with both
good things and bad things (Duchesne et al., 2013). From such studies, van Ingelgom
(2014, p. 176) concludes, ‘An interpretation based on the binary of permissive consensus
and euroscepticism is empirically incomplete if not erroneous’.
A Fourfold Division of Dynamic Evaluations
To assess popular attitudes, a question is needed that recognizes that integration is a
dynamic process because, as Wessels (1995; 145) emphasizes, ‘the willingness to use
the political and economic resources of one’s own country to deepen integration demands
a more active degree of support’. While the Eurobarometer (2013) routinely collects data
evaluating the European Union as it is, it does not couple this with a question about
support for the principle of further integration. Consistent with the interests of DGs
wanting to expand their particular activities, it may ask about support for speciﬁc policies
that would incidentally have a spillover effect on integration.
The EES (European Election Study) explicitly measures dynamic attitudes toward
integration (for details, see www.piredeu.eu). In its 2009 post-election survey interviewing
27,069 people, it asked: Some say European uniﬁcation should be pushed further. Others
say it has already gone too far. What is your opinion? Respondents are offered an
11-point scale in which Integration has already gone too far is the 0 point and point 10 is
Integration should be pushed further. The description of point 10 avoids the emotive
symbolism of a United States of Europe. Likewise, referring to integration as having ‘gone
too far’ avoids the complementary extreme of proposing national withdrawal or the break-
up of the European Union. Those who choose the intermediate location, point 5, cannot be
described as either pro or anti-integration, because they have rejected both of these
alternatives. Since the 2009 EES study was the ﬁrst to ask this appropriate measure of
the dynamics of integration, the following analysis provides a base line for evaluating
change since then (see Figure 1).
By contrast, the use of the 1–10 scale used in the 1999 and 2004 European Election
Studies did not offer a clear opportunity to show satisfaction with the status quo. A reply
of ‘5’ is mathematically part of the negative half of the scale, but psychologically many
respondents see it as an intermediate category between favouring more or less integration.
In analysing these surveys, Toka et al. (2012) simply treated the scale as a measure of the
degree to which respondents endorse further integration. McLaren (2006, p. 27ff) used a
dynamic Eurobarometer question from 2000 that asked whether people wanted the EU to
play a more important, the same, or a less important role in their daily life. However, the
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dependent variable she created reduced its dynamic utility by combining this question
with a static measure of whether EU membership is a good thing or a bad thing.
Dynamic attitudes toward European integration are tri-modal, not bi-modal (Figure 1).
The largest group, 21 per cent, explicitly reject commitment to either more or less integra-
tion by placing themselves at 5, the mid-point of the scale. Doing so indicates satisfaction
with the status quo by comparison with change (cf. Simon, 1978). Those favouring the
status quo are almost twice as numerous as each group at opposite ends of the scale. Since
those placing themselves at points 4 and 6 are much closer to the scale’s mid-point than
either end point, consistent with spatial theories of individual preferences (Enelow and
Hinich, 1984), we group them among those satisﬁed with the status quo. Since those at
points 3 and 7 clearly position themselves with the anti- and pro-integration groups, they
are assigned to these respective categories. By refusing to place themselves anywhere on
the scale, the ‘don’t knows’ constitute a fourth category. On this basis, 34 per cent of EES
respondents are satisﬁed with the EU as it is; 33 per cent favour further integration; 24 per
cent think integration has gone too far; and 9 per cent are ‘don’t knows’.
The fourfold division of opinion is found in every Member State (see Table 1). In the
great majority of countries the median citizen is satisﬁed with the EU as it is, and in 15
countries the satisﬁed are the largest group. Only two Member States – Romania and
Spain – show a majority in favour of further integration, while only in Latvia and the
United Kingdom do as many as two in ﬁve think European integration has gone too
far. In 12 new Member States where citizens had had less than six years of exposure to
EU membership, an average of 15 percent were ‘don’t knows’, compared to 6 per cent
in the six founder states.
Comparing static and dynamic views about integration demonstrates that the two
questions do not measure the same opinion of individuals, because a majority change
their position when asked to evaluate future integration (see Table 2). Consistent with
the Eurobarometer long-term average, the EES survey found that 63 per cent viewed
the EU as a good thing. However, among those seeing the EU as a good thing, 57 per cent
do not want integration to go further. Among the much smaller group seeing European
integration as bad, more than three-ﬁfths think it has gone too far, while one-quarter are
Figure 1: Attitudes Toward an Ever Closer Union, 2009
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prepared to accept the status quo or tolerate further integration.1 Among those who say the
EU is neither good nor bad, more than four-ﬁfths withhold endorsement of further integra-
tion. In sum, only 34 per cent of 2009 EES respondents conform to the stereotype assumption
that those seeing the EU as a good thing want more of the same and those seeing it as bad
favour less integration. Thus, to avoid misunderstanding, a static measure cannot be used
as a proxy for dynamic preferences; it is necessary to use a dynamic measure.
II. Explaining Dynamic Preferences
To explain dynamic preferences toward more or less European integration, we need a
model that takes into account four different alternatives. We also need to include a
multiplicity of inﬂuences in our model, since what affects being for or against integration
may be different from inﬂuences on endorsement of the status quo or having no opinion.
To account for the fourfold empirical distribution of European opinion today, we set out
hypotheses that differ in which attitude they seek to explain, as well as in the theoretical
inﬂuences that they postulate. Since individuals have formed their EU evaluations in 27
countries that differ nationally (see Table 1), national context as well as individual
characteristics is likely to be signiﬁcant.
A positive evaluation of the performance of government provides a utilitarian justiﬁca-
tion for being committed to further integration (Scharpf, 1999). However, this leaves open
whether it is the performance of national or of EU government that people evaluate. Reif
and Schmitt (1980) postulated that citizens tend to project onto the EU judgements of
their national government, whether favourable or unfavourable. However, the EU’s accu-
mulation of powers that operate concurrently with national government has led Hooghe
and Marks (2009, p. 14) to conclude, ‘The European Union is no longer insulated from
domestic politics; domestic politics is no longer insulated from Europe’. For example, im-
migration, which is part of the EU’s promotion of the free movement of people, can affect
people in countries that attract immigrants. Especially in eurozone countries, economic
contraction and the dissatisfaction with the national government that it stimulates may
be blamed on the EU as well as or instead of national government. The multi-level system
of governance in Europe today makes it increasingly difﬁcult for ordinary citizens to
1 The fourth logical category, those who think the EU is a bad thing that would be improved by further integration, com-
prise only 1 per cent of EES respondents.
Table 2: Static and Dynamic Views of Integration Differ
q80 electorate opinion toward EU integration
anti as is pro dkrf Total
Good thing (63%) 17 35 43 5 100
Neither (24%) 30 38 18 13 100
Bad thing (10%) 64 19 10 8 100
Do not know (3%) 14 23 12 51 100
Total (100%) (25) (34) (33) (9) 100
Source: European Election Study 2009; questions 79 and 80. N=27,069.
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distinguish whether such major political concerns as the economy or immigration reﬂect
the performance of national or EU institutions, or both (Duchesne et al., 2013). Empirical
research on voting at EP elections has conﬁrmed that both national and European inﬂu-
ences are important (see e.g. Hix and Marsh, 2011). Our performance hypothesis leaves
open to empirical determination the extent to which national or EU government is the
source of inﬂuence.
H1 PERFORMANCE: If individuals evaluate the performance of government posi-
tively, they are more likely to favour further rather than less integration.
Engagement is frequently theorized to encourage individuals to favour integration.
Engagement can involve emotional affect, behaviour or knowledge. Identifying with
Europe is the major form of emotional engagement, while those who identify only with
their nation should be more likely to see integration as having gone too far (cf. Risse,
2010; Kaina and Karolewski, 2013). Behavioural activities, such as voting in a European
Parliament election, watching EP election news and the correlate, knowledge of the EU,
are likewise deemed to re-enforce support for further integration. At the contextual level,
Inglehart (2008) has theorized that the longer a country has been an EUMember State, the
greater the proportion of its citizens who have been socialized for much or all their lives to
view the EU as part of their political system and thus support further integration.
However, eurosceptic campaigns assume that the more one knows about the EU, the less
support there will be for further European integration (Leconte, 2010: chapter 6). Since
the overwhelming majority of Europeans are ﬁrst socialized into national politics, interest
in national politics and having a political ideology, whether of the left or the right, may
also affect attitudes toward Europe.
H2 ENGAGEMENT: If individuals are politically engaged, they are more likely to
favour further rather than less integration.
From its founding as the European Economic Community, the European Union has
promoted economic integration. Economic integration distributes both beneﬁts and costs.
Fligstein (2008) has theorized that the Europeanization of economic life chances has cre-
ated a division within national societies between winners and losers (see also Kriesi et al.,
2012). Winners are deﬁned as the more educated, middle-class and higher income groups
with the socio-economic resources to beneﬁt from further integration, while losers are
those who lack the resources to adapt to increased economic integration and are therefore
more likely to think it has gone too far.
H3 WINNERS AND LOSERS: If individuals have more socio-economic resources to
beneﬁt from integration, they are more likely to favour further rather than less
integration.
The attitude of people who reply ‘don’t know’ when asked about further European in-
tegration is appropriately explained by theories of public opinion that emphasize a lack of
socio-economic resources as causing individuals to have no opinion about major political
issues (Dalton and Klingemann, 2007). Inglehart (2008) notes that this is especially
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relevant to opinions about the European Union, since its institutions are most distant from
the everyday lives of people; therefore, understanding the EU requires more education
and interest in politics. Contrary to Fligstein (2008), who views limited resources as stim-
ulating anti-European attitudes, people low in resources can simply be political drop-outs.
H4 LACK OF RESOURCES: If individuals are low in socio-economic resources, they
are more likely to have no opinion about European integration.
Individuals who are ambivalent do not adopt a holistic view of European integration as
either good or bad. Ambivalent Europeans discriminate, evaluating some features of the
EU positively and others negatively. Having two views of Europe is consistent with
European integration having two meanings, one referring to the EU as it is today and
the other referring to further integration. For example, a Briton can evaluate the EU as
a good thing today, while not wanting further integration through the UK joining the
eurozone.
The intermediate position in the static EU integration question – that is, regarding it as
‘neither good nor bad’ – is often treated as a mark of indifference or ignorance (cf. Nilson,
2002; Mutz, 2002). However, holding conﬂicting attitudes may reﬂect an informed and
balanced view (Steenbergen and de Vries, 2012; Stoeckel, 2013). For ambivalent individuals,
the constraining dissensus about European integration identiﬁed at the national level exists
within their own mind. It is met by the EES question offering ambivalent respondents an
alternative to appearing to have no opinion. They can endorse a position that strikes a balance
between conﬂicting inﬂuences pulling them in opposite directions. Refusing to give an
unqualiﬁed endorsement to change in any direction can reﬂect satisfaction with the status quo.
H5 AMBIVALENCE: If individuals hold conﬂicting political attitudes, they are more likely
to favour the EU status quo rather than endorse change.
III. Testing Hypotheses About Integration
The theories reviewed above differentiate European citizens into two groups that appear
to be mirror images of each other – those who favour further integration and those who
think it has gone too far – and two whose relation to these mirror images is problematic.
Therefore, we use multinomial logit in STATA (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2008)
because it makes no assumption about whether there is a linear relationship among
the four groups constituting our dependent variable, attitudes about integration. Instead,
this form of logit separately identiﬁes signiﬁcant inﬂuences for each group when
compared to the reference group, those favouring further integration. Given that the
EES survey covered 27 EU Member States, the analysis is multi-level, with contextual
indicators clustered. Although context indicators are statistically analysed at a separate
level, in Table 3 we present them in relation to the hypothesis for which they are
relevant. To determine statistical signiﬁcance, <.001 is our cut-off point for individual
variables and <.10 for contextual variables. Odds ratios indicate the strength of signif-
icant inﬂuences. (Details of the coding of all variables are given in the Appendix). An
odds ratio of more than 1.00 indicates that an independent variable makes people more
strongly committed to their position than those who are pro-integration. An odds ratio of
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less than 1.00 indicates that an independent variable makes people less committed than
those who are pro-integration.2
Divisions Between Pro and Anti-Integration Groups
As hypothesis 1 predicts, how people evaluate government performance is of major im-
portance in differentiating those favouring more and less integration (Table 3). Evaluation
of the EU today is measured by a ﬁve-point scale combining replies to two EES ques-
tions: trust in EU institutions (47 per cent have trust) and whether EU decisions are usu-
ally in the best interests of your country (44 per cent are conﬁdent of this).3 As expected,
the more positive people are about the EU, the more strongly they endorse further
2 To test whether different results would be obtained by assigning 4s and 6s to the anti and pro-integration groups respec-
tively, we re-ran the logit in Table 3 with this adjustment. The statistical results were similar, and so was the identiﬁcation of
independent variables as signiﬁcant or not signiﬁcant. The only difference is consistent with our initial decision to group
replies by spatial distance. By assigning the 4s and 6s to extreme groups this made the two categories more moderate, thus
reducing slightly the size of odds ratios representing the difference between the pro and anti groups by a few decimal points.
3 . The tau beta correlation between these two variables is 0.36, signiﬁcant at the .000 level.
Table 3: Inﬂuences on Dynamic Attitudes to Integration
Multinomial logit
Reference category: Pro-EU
Anti As is Don’t know
Odds Ratio P Odds Ratio P Odds Ratio P
PERFORMANCE
Positive about EU 0.45 0.000 0.74 0.000 0.64 0.000
EU impact 0.96 0.000 0.97 0.000 1.00 0.661
Immigration gone too far 1.42 0.000 1.11 0.000 1.07 0.004
Economy contracted 0.95 0.000 0.98 0.000 0.98 0.003
Government more corrupt 0.87 0.000 0.84 0.000 1.22 0.000
Dissatisﬁed nat’l government 1.20 0.000 1.08 0.021 0.97 0.519
Dissatisﬁed nat’l economy 1.03 0.190 0.96 0.013 0.96 0.146
ENGAGEMENT
Identiﬁes as European 0.61 0.000 0.76 0.000 0.51 0.000
Knowledge of EU 1.18 0.000 1.04 0.180 0.77 0.000
EU founder countries 1.33 0.000 1.23 0.000 1.09 0.221
New EU members 0.81 0.000 0.92 0.042 1.96 0.000
Voted EP election 0.99 0.753 0.93 0.068 0.91 0.081
Neither left nor right views 1.10 0.009 1.23 0.000 2.40 0.000
Interest in politics 0.97 0.390 0.79 0.000 0.58 0.000
Watch EP election news 1.00 0.929 1.01 0.805 0.89 0.003
WINNERS AND LOSERS
Class 1.02 0.370 0.98 0.222 1.02 0.569
Education 0.97 0.131 1.04 0.051 0.64 0.000
Standard of living 0.81 0.000 0.88 0.000 0.71 0.000
Age 1.02 0.064 0.97 0.003 1.14 0.000
Female 1.09 0.022 1.29 0.000 1.69 0.000
Constant 5.72 0.000 6.58 0.000 1.13 0.606
LRchi2 7721.54; Log likelihood -31070.81; Pseudo R
2
0.11
Source: European Election Study (EES) 2009 (www.piredeu.eu). Individual respondents in 27 countries, 27,069.
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integration. The perceived impact of the EU on national life is measured by combining
replies to four questions about its effect on the national economy, interest rates, immigra-
tion and health care. The mean response is that it has some impact. People who see the
impact of the EU as stronger are more likely to favour further integration.
The dichotomy between national politics and EU politics proposed by Reif and
Schmitt (1980) has been undermined as competences for immigration and the manage-
ment of the economy have been integrated in a multi-level system of governance. The
EU’s single European market allows the free movement of people between Member
States and enlargement has made immigration more attractive by increasing economic
disparities between Member States. A total of 57 percent of EES respondents think that
immigration has gone too far and the effect of this view substantially increases the belief
that integration has gone too far (odds ratio 1.41). The change in gross domestic product
between 2008 and 2009 involved economic contraction rather than growth, thus challeng-
ing the putative beneﬁt of the EU’s economic policies. The more the economy has
contracted, the less likely people are to favour further integration, the policy the EU has
adopted to deal with the economic crisis. The relevance of the EU to economic perfor-
mance is underscored by the failure of dissatisfaction with the national economy to have
a statistically signiﬁcant effect.
Dissatisfaction with the performance of national government pushes in two opposing
directions, depending on the cause. In EU Member States that are rated more negatively
on the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (www.transparency.org),
citizens are signiﬁcantly more likely to favour further integration. This appears to reﬂect
an expectation or hope that greater EU inﬂuence will reduce national malgoverno. The 52
per cent generally dissatisﬁed with their national government tend to project their feelings
onto EU governance, thus making them more likely to be against further integration.
Engagement with Europe has a signiﬁcant effect on attitudes toward further integration
– but not always in the direction predicted in hypothesis 2. Consistent with a large body of
social science theory, individuals who identify themselves as Europeans are signiﬁcantly
more likely to favour further integration. However, the evidence rejects the assumption of
Brussels policy-makers that greater knowledge of Europe will lead to greater support for
integration. The opposite is the case: knowing more about the EU signiﬁcantly increases
the view that integration has gone too far (odds ratio 1.17). This ﬁnding is a reminder that
greater knowledge is likely to bring with it more knowledge of the EU’s deﬁciencies as
well as its strengths. Likewise, familiarity with the EU as a result of living in one of
the six founder states makes an individual more likely to think integration has gone too
far, while those with least exposure because they live in new Member States are signiﬁ-
cantly more likely to be pro-integration.
Two measures of engagement with EU affairs – voting in a European Parliament elec-
tion and watching news of that election on television – do not differentiate supporters and
opponents of integration. Two more measures of political engagement relevant to national
as well as EU levels – interest in politics and seeing oneself as on the left or the right –
likewise have no signiﬁcant inﬂuence. The failure of the engagement hypothesis to gain
substantial support indicates that those who reject an ever closer Union are just as en-
gaged with European affairs as those who endorse integration.
Notwithstanding the impact of the European Union on ordinary Europeans, it has not
created the trans-national division between winners and losers anticipated in hypothesis 3.
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Those who hold opposing views for and against integration do not differ signiﬁcantly
from each other in their social class, education, age or gender (Table 3). The only signif-
icant inﬂuence is an individual’s self-assessed standard of living; the lower it is, the more
likely a person is to think integration has gone too far. The weak inﬂuence of socio-
economic differences is consistent with the Kinder and Kiewiet (1979) theory that ego-
centric judgements emphasized by winners-and-losers theories are less important than
judgements of the collective performance of government.
‘Don’t Knows’ in a Class of Their Own
Consistent with hypothesis 4, those with no opinion about European integration are low in
socio-economic resources (Table 2). ‘Don’t knows’ are the only group whose attitude is
signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by education and age; they are less educated and older than other
Europeans. Having a lower standard of living has a bigger effect on the don’t knows than
on other groups and they are also more likely to be women.
‘Don’t knows’ are also less engaged in politics. They have great difﬁculty in placing
themselves on the conventional left/right scale (odds ratio: 2.37). This is not because they
have strong political views that are orthogonal to that scale, but because they are much
less interested in politics generally. As for the EU, ‘don’t knows’ are less knowledgeable
and opinionated, and since they are much more likely to live in new Member States, they
have not been fully socialized into identifying with Europe. ‘Don’t knows’ are signiﬁ-
cantly less likely to be positive about Europe. However, this is not a judgement on EU
performance; it is due to the ‘don’t knows’ being less likely to have any view. For each
of the questions making up the evaluation of the EU indicator, the ‘don’t know’ group
is four times more likely than others to lack a positive or a negative opinion. While this
proﬁle of the ‘don’t knows’ is consistent with the negative stereotype that EU elites often
use to reject increased popular participation by uninformed citizens, it applies to only 9
per cent of EES respondents (Figure 1).
Ambivalent and Satisﬁed
The ambivalence hypothesis postulates that those who are satisﬁed with the status quo are
subject to a combination of inﬂuences pushing them in opposite directions, some
favouring more and some favouring less integration. Multinomial logit makes it possible
to test this hypothesis by identifying inﬂuences that signiﬁcantly affect those wanting no
change by comparison with other categories of EES respondents. If those we group as sat-
isﬁed were inclined to show permissive consent to further integration, a lot of inﬂuences
would signiﬁcantly differentiate them from the anti group, but not from those favouring
further integration. However, if the satisﬁed are inclined toward less integration as a sec-
ond choice, then inﬂuences would signiﬁcantly differentiate them from those wanting to
go further, but not from those thinking integration has already gone too far. If the choice
of an intermediate answer is really a form of concealing no opinion, then the multinomial
logit should show many of the same inﬂuences affecting both those we labelled satisﬁed
and the ‘don’t knows’. A balanced form of ambivalence is that instead of veering between
the two extremes, inﬂuences usually place respondents in this group between those with
pronounced pro or anti-integration views.
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The largest group of EES respondents, those satisﬁed with things as they are, have a
balanced view of the integration process. Inmost cases in which performance or engagement
variables exert a signiﬁcant inﬂuence, the odds ratios place them between the pro and
anti-integration blocs (Table 3). Among the signiﬁcant performance inﬂuences, being
positive about the EU has an odds ratio of 0.45 for those who are anti-integration compared
to 0.74 for the satisﬁed and the implied 1.00 for those favouring more integration. Similarly,
for those thinking that immigration has gone too far, the odds ratio differentiating the
anti-integration group from the further integration group is 1.41 while the odds ratio
for the satisﬁed is 1.11. The effect of economic contraction signiﬁcantly differentiates
proponents of the status quo from advocates of further change, but it is not as strong
as the effect on the anti-integration group.
To describe the satisﬁed as being in two minds about European integration is correct,
but need not imply that individuals feel strong internal conﬂicts. In terms of engagement
with politics, the satisﬁed and the anti-integrationists are less likely to identify with
Europe, but their rationales differ. For the anti-integration group, not having a European
identity appears to be part of a syndrome of nationalist attitudes that reject many features
of the EU as it is today. For the satisﬁed, not thinking of oneself as a European is a sign of
less strong engagement with politics. The satisﬁed are signiﬁcantly less likely to be
interested in politics than either the anti or the pro-integration groups. Similarly, while
both pro and anti-groups are alike in placing themselves on a left/right scale, those who
are satisﬁed are signiﬁcantly less likely to think that this scale reﬂects their political
outlook. Being less engaged with politics is also a mark of the ‘don’t knows’, but unlike
the latter group, those who are satisﬁed are not uninformed, non-participating and lacking
in education. The satisﬁed are just as likely to vote in a European Parliament election and
watch EP election news as those who are ﬁrmly pro or anti-integration. Moreover, the
satisﬁed are just as likely to be knowledgeable about the European Union as those who
are pro-integration and signiﬁcantly more likely than pro-integrationists to live in an
EU founder state.
Conclusions
The theoretical importance of the often overlooked distinction between static and dynamic
support for the European Union is empirically conﬁrmed. Our fourfold classiﬁcation shows
that the debate about the future of the EU cannot be reduced to a dichotomous division
between those wanting more and less integration. The median group of European citizens
are not committed to change; they prefer the status quo.
Of the three sets of inﬂuences on attitudes to integration, the performance of European
political institutions has the most effect. Having a positive view of the EU’s performance
and awareness of its impact are of ﬁrst-order importance for dynamic preferences. The
effect of the EU is also registered through individuals’ negative evaluations of the EU’s
impact on immigration and the economy. As for engagement, although diffuse identiﬁca-
tion with Europe does boost support for further integration, the opposite is not the case.
Non-identiﬁers are as likely to endorse the status quo as to think integration has gone
too far. Speciﬁc measures of engagement such as voting at European elections or
watching EP election news have no signiﬁcant inﬂuence on attitudes. Contrary to the
assumption of well-funded EU communications programmes that more information about
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Europe will create more support for integration, knowledge of the EU and living in an EU
founder state are signiﬁcantly more likely to encourage the view that integration has gone
too far. Although European integration has undoubtedly created both winners and losers
within many societies, being more educated, a major asset for success in a cosmopolitan
Europe, has no signiﬁcant effect on views. Nor does subjective social class, a measure of
perceived life chances. There is partial support for hypothesis 3 in that lower income
people are less likely to favour further integration. There remains the possibility of an
indirect effect too. At national elections, individuals who see themselves as losers may
vote for protest parties that, among other things, are anti-EU.
Since the 2009 EES, there has been time for independent variables to change, and with
those, attitudes toward further integration. However, variables having a signiﬁcant inﬂu-
ence on attitudes toward integration differ in their potential for change. Major components
of political engagement, such as the length of time a country has belonged to the EU, are
givens and the percentage of the population identifying themselves as Europeans requires
a decade or generation to alter substantially (cf. Inglehart, 2008; Down and Wilson,
2013). Most socio-economic characteristics are not subject to short-term change and in
any case are not signiﬁcant inﬂuences. Performance variables are most immediately subject
to alteration in response to political and economic change. In the single European market,
economic growth targets have failed to be met. The eurozone crisis has had negative effects
on a substantial portion of Europeans and the eurozone media have been ready to link
national economic issues with the EU.
The post-2014 European Parliament election survey (www.eeshomepage.net) conﬁrms
that there has been a change in the expected direction in attitudes toward further
integration. However, the extent is marginal: 8 per cent fewer Europeans now endorse
further integration and 8 per cent more Europeans now think that integration has gone
too far. The largest group remains the same: the 34 per cent who on balance prefer the
EU not to change in either direction. The satisﬁed group has remained the largest because
the minority shifting from ambivalence to anti-integration has been replaced by those
who previously favoured further integration becoming ambivalent. See Figure 2.4
The limited shift in public attitudes toward European integration is consistent with our
theoretical approach, which emphasizes the importance of a multiplicity of inﬂuences on
attitudes. The standard question about whether the EU is today a good or a bad thing
showed a parallel marginal change; the majority endorsing the EU as a good thing fell
by 9 percentage points from 63 per cent in 2009 to 54 per cent in 2014. Substantial
changes in the EES questionnaire between 2009 and 2014 make it impossible to evaluate
the extent of change in major performance variables. One indicator of being positive
about the EU –thinking it makes decisions in the interest of one’s country – was dropped
and the coding of the other, about trust in the EU, was altered.
The response of European institutions to the eurozone crisis has been a process
described in French as la fuite en avant, ‘running away forwards’ – that is, the adoption
of political and economic measures that increase integration. The European Council
communique of 27 June 2014 that approved Claude Juncker as the new President of
4 These inferences are based on the assumption of spatial preferences making it easier to shift in and out of the intermediate
group than to change sides completely. If panel data were available, it would undoubtedly show a larger amount of gross
than of net change. Policy-makers tend to be more sensitive to changes in the aggregate distribution of public opinion.
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the European Commission reafﬁrmed the commitment to an ever closer Union. In an
associated press conference, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel acknowledged that
while Member States might progress at different speeds, this will not stop movement
toward further integration (Shipman and Pancevski, 2014).
In public policy terms, the above evidence shows that while EU institutions are
moving toward an ever closer Union, European citizens are not. The largest group are
in favour of the EU as it is, and only a quarter to a third endorse further integration. Given
this, EU ofﬁcials do not want to consult with public opinion through such means as ref-
erendums on treaties. The former President of the European Commission, Jose Manuel
Barroso, has justiﬁed this position by saying that direct consultation with EU citizens
was undesirable because it would require ‘simplifying important and complex subjects’
for decision by people uninformed about EU affairs (quoted in Hobolt, 2009, p. 23).
The 2014 European Parliament election showed an increase from one-sixth to almost
one-third in the number of MEPs elected by anti-EU parties. Nonetheless, two-thirds of
MEPs have been elected on pro-integration programme (see Borz and Rose, 2010; Rose
and Borz, 2013; www.EUandI.eu). However, the principle of subsidiarity gives citizens
the opportunity at national elections to hold their government accountable for what they
accept at the EU level (Rose, 2014).
Unlike a public opinion survey, there is no intermediate choice in a national
referendum ballot on EU measures. The ambivalence of so large a portion of Europeans
shows that the swing bloc of voters is not ﬁrmly committed against further integration, just
as it is not committed in favour. However, to get this group to endorse any change would
require clear and convincing arguments showing that the EU’s performance would be
improved by further integration – arguments that eurosceptics can challenge. At the
end of a referendum campaign, the default position of satisﬁed conservatives is to
endorse the status quo. If the ballot proposal is to increase current powers, the likelihood
is a vote against an ever closer Union. However, if a referendum ballot proposes withdrawal
from the EU, the default position is to vote to remain a Member State.
Figure 2: Comparing Attitudes Toward Integration, 2009-14
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